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ABSTRACT

EUROPE’S (LACK OF) WELFARE CHAUVINISM:
EVIDENCE FROM SURVEYS AND SPENDING

Immigration’s effect on European welfare states is complicated. On one hand, increased
immigration might undermine social solidarity and impose greater fiscal burdens on
redistribution, reducing support for welfare spending. On the other, natives could respond to
greater globalization with economic anxiety, increasing support for redistribution in order to
mitigate risk. Welfare chauvinism predicts a mixed effect—increased spending for programs
that middle-class natives use and reduced spending for programs that benefit immigrants
disproportionately. I test this theory by analyzing (1) European attitudes towards immigration
and welfare spending and (2) actual spending on these programs, particularly social housing.
Additionally, I present a brief case study of France’s immigration/welfare relationship. Despite
large increases in immigration, I find no significant increase in welfare chauvinistic attitudes
and no systematic relationship between immigration and social spending. This surprising
result—which contradicts recent empirical findings—suggests that immigration-based fears
about Western European welfare states are overstated.
Keywords: immigration, welfare state, populism, France
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EUROPE’S (LACK OF) WELFARE CHAUVINISM:
EVIDENCE FROM SURVEYS AND SPENDING

Europe’s populist resurgence suggests that the continent’s appetite for globalization
may be satiated. Immigration especially is testing European tolerance. Prominent academic
voices claim that immigration has spurred the retreat of liberalism (Zielonka 2018) and may
even cause the “strange death of Europe” (Murray 2018). They and others are especially
worried about immigration-induced changes to welfare state attitudes and behaviors. Several
theories support their concerns. Particularly, the welfare chauvinism hypothesis predicts
increased spending for programs that many natives use and retrenchment for programs that
benefit immigrants disproportionately. I build off previous research that supports the
chauvinism hypothesis by extending the analysis to social housing spending. Surprisingly, I
find that robust econometric specifications produce no significant causal relationship
between immigration and social housing spending. In fact, I find no systematic relationship
between immigration and any social spending program. This is puzzling given the correlation
between recent surges in immigration and the resurgence of populism. These findings
contradict apocalyptic voices who claim that immigration is an existential threat to European
welfare states.
On the contrary, immigration may be an important part of their survival. The welfare
state in Europe was built during a period of robust population growth but before the rapid
increase in life expectancy. It was easy to finance these new programs when the workforce
was growing, but since Europe’s working-age population is now shrinking and will continue
to do so for at least three decades, the welfare state is under increasing financial pressure
(Vartiainen, 2018, p. 132). Immigrants fill job vacancies and contribute to social insurance
1

for the elderly. Even so, recent surges in immigration seem to be testing the limits of this
potential solution. Understanding the causal relationship between immigration, populism, and
welfare state spending is essential in order to sustain the viability of social protection
schemes.
II. Theoretical Expectations
No collection of theories gives clear predictions about the impact of immigration on
welfare state retrenchment, at least in part because the causal pathway linkages are extended
and sensitive to many other factors (see Figure 1). A simplified causal chain begins with
immigration flows affecting natives’ perception of the economic and cultural security. These
perceptions then influence political orientation and election outcomes. Finally, these
governmental configurations should eventually translate into policy, although policy lags,
noisy feedback loops, or opposition party resistance could distort legislation and
implementation. I begin with a theoretical discussion on how immigration could influence
native attitudes about welfare, then describe the theories predicting various spending
reactions.
Figure 1. Causal Chain between Immigration and Welfare Spending

From an economic standpoint, most citizens are better off because of migration.
Current levels of immigration generally improve the economies of host countries and benefit
most of their citizens (Collier, 2013). Several lines of research predict that opening migration
flows further could bring even more economic benefits, potentially trillions of dollars of
2

increased output (Clemens 2011). Immigrants are usually much more productive in rich
countries. Capital owners benefit from more labor to operate their machines. Even so,
immigration creates losers. Standard economic modeling predicts that immigration of lowskilled workers puts downward pressure on native low-skilled workers’ wages and can
increase unemployment. Non-economic factors matter too. The dilution of the host country’s
culture, acts of violence committed by immigrants, and problematic integration can all
influence natives’ perceptions and engender anti-immigration sentiment.
Indeed, recent levels of immigration seem to have rattled European natives. The
positive correlation between immigration and right-wing populism voting has been tested and
demonstrated in a variety of national and political contexts (Facchini & Mayda, 2009).
Evidence from France, however, suggests that the association is not as simple as it may seem
(Della Posta, 2013, p. 250). At the department (regional) level, large immigration does
indeed lead to higher vote share for the far-right National Front party. At the commune
(town) level, however, large immigrant populations are associated with lower National Front
votes. Intergroup contact potentially mitigates native anxiety as more frequent social contact
with immigrants lessens social distance and alleviates tensions that lead to anti-immigrant
sentiment (Della Posta, 2013, p. 250). The overall ambiguity caused by these opposing
pressures provides the basis for my null hypothesis that increased immigration does not
systematically worsen natives’ beliefs about immigrants or the welfare state.
Other theories, however, provide different predictions regarding natives’ perceptions
of immigration and suggest competing hypotheses for welfare support. Like Della Posta
(2013), Burgoon et. al. (2012) examines how various frames of reference influence
perceptions of immigration by comparing the nationwide immigrant stock to the number of
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immigrants in a native respondent’s occupation. He finds that national-level immigration
affects populist voting only marginally, if at all. However, workers in industries that have
relatively high concentrations of immigrants are much more likely to vote for an extreme
right party. If natives are uncomfortable with the current level of immigration, they could
respond in several ways. The solidarity hypothesis suggests that higher levels of ethnicallyheterogeneous immigration increase the fiscal costs of redistribution and diminish social
solidarity, therefore reducing welfare support (Burgoon, Koster, & van Egmond, 2012,
p. 291). On the other hand, the anxiety hypothesis suggests that, especially for low-skilled
native workers, increasing levels of immigration might heighten economic anxiety and
reinforce support for redistribution in order to mitigate risk (Burgoon, 2001). With both of
these theories, we might observe that increased immigration lowers natives’ willingness to
fund welfare programs for immigrants (Vadlamannati & Kelly, 2017).
H1: Increased immigration lowers natives’ willingness to fund welfare
programs for immigrants.
Recent work by Dennis Spies (Schmidt-Catran & Spies, 2016; Spies, 2018; Spies &
Schmidt-Catran, 2016) synthesizes these theories into the welfare chauvinism hypothesis and
links them with actual spending behavior using econometric analysis. He suggests that social
protection schemes are too complex to garner either categorical support or rejection in the
wake of immigration. Spies considers three particular protection schemes: old-age insurance,
health insurance, and unemployment insurance. He finds that immigration has a positive
correlation with old-age insurance and health insurance spending but a negative correlation
with unemployment insurance spending. His theory is that many workers in the middle-class
either benefit from or anticipate benefitting from the first two programs, and immigrant
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participation in them is relatively low. Unemployment insurance, on the other hand,
disproportionately benefits immigrants.
H2: More immigration causes increased spending on social programs that
most natives use or anticipate needing (e.g. old age and health insurance)
but decreased spending on programs they perceive to benefit immigrants
disproportionately (e.g. unemployment insurance).
I further evaluate this theory by examining another realm of social protection: public
housing assistance. Spies (2018) suggests this area for further study since public housing
assistance also disproportionately benefits immigrants (Fougère, Kramarz, Rathelot, & Safi,
2013; Scanlon, Fernández Arrigoitia, & Whitehead, 2015, 3). In France, 15 percent of French
natives lived in public housing in 1999—the participation rate for immigrants was closer to
50 percent (Scanlon et al., 2015, 5). Further, while unemployment insurance is funded at
least in part through worker contributions, public housing assistance is financed completely
through taxes. These two facts indicate that this more redistributive program may be
particularly vulnerable to retrenchment or welfare chauvinism with high rates of
immigration. An example from Austria is useful. Before 2003, non-EU nationals were
ineligible for access to public housing, regardless of length of stay. A 2003 EU directive
mandated member states to permit individuals with foreign residence permits to access social
services and transfers. In Austrian cities with large stocks of immigrants, this mandate fueled
the belief that natives were competing with immigrants for access to a limited public housing
stock, and populist parties won greater shares of votes in those areas (Cavaille & Ferwerda,
2016, 11). Since it is legally difficult to exclude immigrants from welfare transfers
altogether, societies with welfare chauvinistic attitudes could instead reduce total funding for
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specific types of programs that (they perceive to) benefit immigrants disproportionately. In
line with H2, I expect public housing expenditures as a percent of GDP to eventually
decrease as a result of higher immigration.
Certain factors complicate the analysis by distorting the relationship between
immigration, native attitudes, and actual spending. First, since immigrants are typically poor
relative to citizens of the host country (Burgoon, 2014), an increase in immigration should
eventually lead to an increase in social expenditure. This is true if immigrants become
eligible for social assistance in the years after their arrival and if the political status quo
remains the same. Thus, even if natives succeed in legislating lower welfare allowances per
head, the number of heads increases because of immigration. Second, there are likely policy
lags between native desires to curb spending and legislated retrenchment. Because different
countries may have different lags, uncovering a systematic relationship might be difficult.
Finally, even if natives elect politicians who actually want to reduce spending, political and
practical opposition might be significant. Natives also use social services that benefit
immigrants, and they might be successful in blocking attempts to curb spending.
H3:

Absent

institutional

changes,

increased

immigration

will

automatically increase social spending.
H4: Even if many natives want to reduce welfare spending, political
opposition successfully blocks such attempts.
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III. Methodology and Data
The first step in investigating this black box of a causal chain is to see what comes
out at the end. To test the effect of immigration on actual spending, I extend Spies’ model
using public housing data:
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
where W is the welfare position of the government and X is a vector of control variables. I
use data from 1980 to 2015 and include thirteen Western European countries in the analysis
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).
The necessary data are available from multiple sources. I utilize the OECD’s Social
Protection Database which tracks annual expenditure by social protection program category
for European countries ("OECD Social Expenditure Statistics," 2018). The OECD
International Migration Database tracks the foreign-born population in each country of
interest, including refugees ("OECD International Migration Statistics," 2017). The welfare
position of government is proxied using information from the Comparative Manifesto Project
(CMP) which “isolates quasi-sentences in a party’s manifesto and pairs them with fifty-six
predefined policy categories” to estimate the priority of each party based on the percentages
in each category (Volkens et al., 2018). This is an important control variable because the
welfare position of a country influences its spending on social programs but is also likely
correlated with the number of immigrants it accepts. The vector of other control variables
includes unemployment, GDP growth, and public debt (OECD, World Bank).
My identification strategy is a fixed effects model with country dummies and clustercorrected standard errors. The dependent variable is the percent change in spending as a
percent of GDP from the previous year. These specification choices aim to reduce potential
7

problems with a panel data set: endogeneity and autocorrelation. The main measure for
immigration is the percent change in the inflow of foreigners as a percent of the population.
The primary variables are summarized below:
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
−
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∶
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1
−
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∶
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
Although I do use foreign stock as a percent of the population in one model, I argue that
primarily using inflows is a better way to gauge natives’ perceptions of contemporary
immigration since areas with large stocks might be more ‘used’ to them—the same flow in
country A with a large stock and in country B with a small stock might increase native
anxiety more in country B since it is not accustomed to having a large immigrant community.
Using percent changes rather than levels mitigates autocorrelation problems that arise from
standard panel data models. This choice departs from Spies’ methodology which uses only
levels, since models with percent changes are more “harsh.” A broader discussion of this
divergence is included in the empirical results section.
After understanding how immigration is correlated with welfare spending, I
investigate the first part of the causal chain—immigration’s impact on attitudes towards
welfare. I report several findings from the European Social Survey, a broad and
comprehensive survey administered in Europe every two years. Round 4 of this survey
included a module measuring welfare attitudes in 23 European countries in 2008 and featured
56,752 respondents. The same module was conducted again in Round 8 in 2016 with 44,387
8

respondents. The survey includes dozens of questions on a variety of topics, and two
particular questions are useful in this paper’s analysis. The first gauges respondents’ views
about the timeline for immigrant eligibility of social benefits. Europeans were asked at what
point immigrants should obtain the “same rights to social benefits and services as citizens
already living here” (European Social Survey ERIC, 2009 & 2017). The second asks if the
current level of social spending is damaging to the economy. Since the period between 2008
and 2016 experienced mass immigration, significant changes in these answers would suggest
that immigration indeed changes natives’ attitudes towards welfare.
IV. Empirical Results
Spending
Obviously, immigration in Europe has increased significantly in recent decades. In
1989, foreigners accounted for an average of 3.5 percent of the population for the 13 Western
European countries previously identified. By 2014, that number swelled to 13.4 percent.
Immigration inflows have ballooned as well, from an average of 0.48 percent of the
population in 1984 to 1.2 percent of the population in 2015.
Figure 2 compares trends in immigration with trends in social spending. The sample
average for total social spending as a percent of GDP (bold red line) trended upwards from
1980 to 2015. This is also true for each of the specific programs I analyze except
unemployment insurance, which ebbs and flows but is roughly flat. These trends give
preliminary support for H3 that increased immigration (but constant eligibility and
distribution rules) leads to increased social spending since they are typically poor and qualify
for welfare programs.
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Figure 2. Immigration and Social Spending (sample average)

Figure 3 shows the correlation between immigration and housing expenditure
specifically and yields a puzzling result. On average, there appears to be a roughly inverse
relationship between the average flow of immigrants as a percent of the population and the
percent of GDP spent on housing benefits (consistent with H2). This trend does not hold for
every country in the sample, but it is present for many of the countries (see the appendix for a
selection of country-specific graphs). Alternatively—and not so obviously—the relationship
may be describing the lag in immigrants’ arrival to the host nation and their eligibility to
receive social benefits, which varies by country. With this lag, the trends could in fact be
parallel. This would support H3 that immigration increases social spending with an eligibility
lag.
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Figure 3. Immigration and Housing Spending (sample average)
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To truly test the hypotheses, it is important to examine the regression results,
not just the descriptive correlations. Table 1 lays out the results of various regression
specifications. The first seven models evaluate the relationship between immigration and
social housing expenditures, while the final three examine expenditures on old age, housing,
and unemployment insurance. The first housing model’s main independent variable is the
inflow of foreigners as a percentage of population. Consistent with H2 (immigration leading
to lower welfare spending), the coefficient’s sign is negative and statistically significant at
the 0.01 level. The coefficient’s magnitude is tricky to interpret since the main independent
and dependent variables are both percentages. For Model (1), an increase in the inflow of
immigrants from one percent to two percent of the population (roughly double the sample
average) is associated with a seven percentage point decline in social housing spending’s rate
of change. For example, if other factors would normally cause a 10 percent increase in social
11

housing expenditures, a one percentage point increase in migrant inflows (as a percent of the
population) would bring the increase in social housing expenditures down to roughly three
percent. This magnitude is small but not negligible. The next four models include lags of
foreign immigrant inflow at one year, three years, and five years respectively. The lag at one
year is still negative and barely significant at the 0.10 level. The lag at three years is actually
positive, but not statistically significant. The lag at five years is negative again, but also not
statistically significant.
Model (5) includes both the current level of immigration and the three-year lag.
Interestingly, the sign of the three-year lag is positive while the sign of the contemporary
variable is negative. This might suggest that it takes several years for immigrants to become
eligible to receive social housing benefits, so a surge in immigration would not translate into
an increase in spending until later (H3). Counteracting this upward pressure could be mass
contemporary immigration that makes natives uneasy, therefore applying downward pressure
to spending immediately. Since neither coefficient is statistically significant, the data do not
give robust support to this theory.

12

Table 1. Regression Estimates
Housing
(1)
Immigration:
Inflow

(2)

(3)

-7.751**
(2.43)

Inflow n-1

13

Public debt

(6)

(7)

Old-age

Health

(8)

(9)

0.788
(0.74)

-2.066
(1.36)

Unemployme
nt
(10)
0.639
(4.24)

-5.647
(3.15)
4.404
(7.50)

Inflow n-5

GDP growth

(5)
-6.914
(3.88)

Inflow n-3

Stock, %
of
population
Inflow, %
of stock
Controls:
Unemployment

s
(4)

7.882
(7.37)
-2.967
(4.49)
-0.970
(0.69)
0.092
(0.27)

0.472
0.477
(0.53)
(0.61)
1.929*** -2.080***
(0.30)
(0.36)

0.449
(0.69)
-1.828**
(0.51)

0.953
(0.79)
-1.935***
(0.37)

0.088
(0.56)
-1.855**
(0.50)

1.326
(0.80)
-1.925***
(0.27)

-0.149**
(0.04)

-0.109*
(0.04)

-0.119**
(0.03)

-0.093*
(0.03)

-0.125
(0.06)

-0.119**
(0.04)

Welfare score

0.360
(0.54)
1.690***
(0.09)
0.048***
(0.01)
0.018
(0.15)
10.803
(6.46)

-0.052
(0.12)
1.337***
(0.09)
0.048***
(0.01)
-0.029
(0.03)
7.566***
(1.10)

-0.655*
(0.24)
-1.012***
(0.09)
0.008
(0.05)

-0.330
(0.86)
-6.566*
(2.16)
-0.263
(0.17)

0.193
0.137
-0.014
0.137
0.043
0.215
0.074
-0.402
(0.18)
(0.15)
(0.19)
(0.18)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.10)
(0.36)
Constant
18.112*
14.871*
8.992
8.932
12.406*
13.537
7.749
43.454
(7.10)
(6.56)
(6.17)
(6.15)
(4.47)
(8.61)
(3.67)
(21.65)
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Each model uses fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Following the identification strategy I described, each dependent variable is the
change from the previous year. “Inflow” measures the percentage of the inflow of foreigners to the whole population of the country. “Stock”
measures the percentage of the stock of foreigners to the whole population of the country. “Inflow as a percentage of stock” provides a quasiinteraction between inflows and stocks.
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Models (6) and (7) use different measures of immigration. All previous models
examined the impact of yearly immigration flows as a percent of the population. Model (6)
instead uses the stock of foreigners as a percent of the population. This is important if
relatively small flows of immigration to a small base of immigrants is perceived as
unproblematic or even beneficial. On the other hand, even with small annual flows, a large
immigrant stock could unsettle anxious voters who observe overcrowded schools, hospitals,
and neighborhoods. The coefficient has a negative sign but is small and not statistically
significant. Model (7) measures the annual flow of migrants as a percentage of the total
stock. This variation is insightful because it essentially interacts flows with stocks. A flow
that is small compared to the native population may be large relative to the existing stock. As
mentioned earlier, regions with little exposure to migrants are more anxious about migrant
inflows than areas with larger stocks. This coefficient is positive, but small and not
statistically significant.
Finally, models (8) – (10) report the standard specification for old age, health, and
unemployment insurance respectively. None are statistically significant. These results are
admittedly troubling. There is no real theoretical framework to suggest that immigration
should have a strongly significant effect on housing but not on other programs. This suggests
the possibility that the results from model (1) are sensitive to a specification that just
happened to be significant. There are several reasons why this could be so.
The research upon which this analysis is based found statistically significant effects
of immigration on old age, health, and unemployment insurance, but no significant effect on
overall social spending (largely because, as H2 predicts, immigration may have diverging
effects on various programs). My model specifications are different. First, I use slightly
14

different data. Though the countries in the sample are the same, mine spans through 2015
while Spies’ data stops in 2007. Dramatic increases in immigration have occurred since then,
so a less than equivalently dramatic change in welfare spending would attenuate the
estimates. Further, compared to Spies’ approach, my model is more ‘harsh’. His approach
does not utilize a fixed effects model that removes large parts of variation attributed to
country-specific unobservable characteristics. Finally, instead of using changes in spending,
his approach uses yearly levels of spending as a percent of GDP and does not include lags of
the dependent variable. These choices expose the specification to autocorrelation problems
and do not remove variation that might be caused by country-specific effects. Perhaps this is
why my harsher model fails to find significant effects. It may be that there really is an effect
between immigration and social spending, but not one that is significant enough to survive
robust standard errors—when I use Spies’s specification with my data, I find statistically
significant results consistent with his findings.
Further, the possible existence of country-specific lags is problematic. Different
countries likely have different eligibility and political process lags. Because regressions
require making a fixed set of choices for all countries in the sample, different lags could
attenuate my results. Finally, the measure of welfare spending is not perfect. Since it is a
ratio of actual spending to GDP, it essentially measures two things. Steady social spending
but increasing GDP would cause the ratio to decrease even though there are no substantive
changes in welfare institutions.
Notwithstanding specification limitations, there are certainly theoretical reasons why
a systematic relationship does not exist between immigration and social spending. It might be
that, despite opinion surveys revealing native anxiety about immigration generally, natives
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have not (yet) significantly changed their voting patterns or even their attitudes towards
immigrants’ access to the welfare state. Populist parties have gained footing in Europe in
recent years, but they have not yet reached parliamentary or executive majorities (at least in
this sample). Further, even if many natives wish to curb benefits, it may be politically
difficult to do so since many natives still rely on programs that disproportionately benefit
migrants (H4). To investigate the plausibility of these hypotheses, I analyze immigration’s
impact on attitudes towards social protection programs—the first part of the causal chain.
Attitudes
I report two key questions from the ESS in 2008 and 2016, the two years when the
welfare module was included in the survey The first is a question that asks when the
respondent believes an immigrant should obtain the same rights to social services as citizens:
immediately, after a year (whether or not he/she works), after at least a year of working and
paying taxes, after acquiring citizenship, or never. Secondly, I report on the question “Do
social benefits place too great a strain on the economy?” For clarity, Figure 4 aggregates the
results across the sample of thirteen countries and contrasts them between 2008 and 2016, a
period of mass immigration1.

1

The module was not conducted in both periods for every country. Denmark only has results for 2008, while
Austria and Italy only have results for 2016.
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Figure 4. ESS Data
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In the aggregate, perceptions of the majority do not change significantly. The most
noteworthy change is the percentage of respondents who believe that immigrants should
never get the same rights to social services as natives, from 4.17 percent to 6.86 percent. This
64 percent increase provides some evidence that increased immigration has indeed hardened
attitudes for a part of the population. Even so, purely chauvinistic attitudes are still the
minority, with most citizens (65 percent) believing that immigrants should gain access to
social services immediately or after working and paying taxes for a year. Similarly, there is
little change in the proportion of respondents who believe that social benefits place too great
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a strain on the economy. Feelings on this matter have somewhat polarized—the percentages
of people who strongly agree or strongly disagree each increased by a little less than one
percentage point. These results are robust even when excluding all non-citizen respondents
from the sample2.
These results are surprising. Though only two questions on a survey, these results
support the null hypothesis and suggest that, perhaps contrary to popular belief (Eichengreen,
2018; Murray, 2018; Zielonka, 2018), large-scale migration has not brought dramatic
changes to Europeans’ views about the necessary scope of social protection schemes or about
immigrant’s eligibility. Besides the slight increase in welfare chauvinism among a very small
portion of the population, these results are not consistent with H1 that immigration
undermines social solidarity and support for redistribution. Perhaps this is because the survey
was administered in 2016, not 2015. The year after the height of the refugee crisis, natives
breathed a sigh of relief when lower flows showed that 2015-level mass immigration was not
the new normal. Further, although the European Social Survey is a carefully administered
and widely-respected survey, sampling error and other data problems might soften a harsher
reaction. Nevertheless, given these findings, we might also anticipate finding little, if any,
effect in actual social spending.
V. The French Case
The results presented thus far characterize the average effect of immigration on
various social spending categories for the entire sample of 13 Western European countries.
While large-n studies bring many advantages, they also lack the context and specificity of
individual case studies and may mask significantly heterogeneous effects. Analyzing each

2

Otherwise, increased immigration might spur pro-immigrant views simply because there are more immigrant
respondents.
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country in the sample individually is beyond the scope of any article, but a brief sketch of the
French case adds a level of nuance to my analysis. In short, the relationship between
immigration and social housing support in France is similar to the sample average effects.
French social housing has been a fundamental part of its welfare state for decades.
After the decimation of hundreds of thousands of buildings during World War II, millions of
French people lived in squalor. The death of a mother on the street in Paris in 1954 sparked
public outcry. Soon after, construction of HLMs (Habitations à loyer modéré) skyrocketed
and continued for decades. According to Article 55 of the 1998 “Loi relative à la solidarité et
au renouvelement urbains”, French towns with more than 3,500 inhabitants must designate at
least 20 percent of their housing stock as social housing. Current president Emmanuel
Macron has proposed 1.7 billion euros of social housing benefit cuts as part of an effort to
balance France’s finances. Tenants are not affected, so the hundreds of housing associations
throughout the country that will be vulnerable to the cuts have taken to the streets in protest.
Social housing continues to be contentious political issue in France today.
France-specific results for the European Social Survey question on immigration and
welfare benefits are presented in Figure 5. They roughly match the sample average change
from 2008 to 2016. The proportion of pure welfare chauvinists—those who believe migrants
should never get the same rights to social benefits as natives—is slightly higher in France
with 4.90 percent in 2008 and 7.72 in 2016 (compared to the sample average of 4.17 percent
and 6.86 percent). Even so, the French are more likely to believe that migrants should get
access after working and paying taxes for one year or even sooner, from 69.49 percent in
2008 to 72.08 percent in 2016 (compared to the sample average of 64.18 percent and 64.79
percent). Pure chauvinism increased slightly, but an even larger increase in pro-immigrant
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sentiment more than mitigated its effect. The relationship between immigration and social
housing expenditures as a percent of GDP is also consistent with the sample average. The
trendlines suggest the same competing causal explanations: immigration either negatively
affects housing expenditures immediately or positively affects them with eligibility lags.
Figure 5. France-Specific Findings
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To supplement my econometric analysis, I report several key findings from very
recent work published by d’Albis, Boubtane, & Coulibaly (2019). They analyze the
relationship between immigration and the housing market at the regional level in France over
the period of 1990-2013. First, they note that the foreign-born population is very unevenly
spread throughout the country. The three main administrative regions (Ile-de-France [the
Paris region], Rhône-Alpes, and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur) are home to one third of the
native population but two thirds of the foreign-born population. Second, they find that, as
20

Scanlon et. al (2015) reported, immigrants are more likely than natives to benefit from social
housing programs: the percentages of native- and foreign-born renters living in social
housing are 40 percent and 52 percent, respectively3. Finally, and most importantly, they
conclude that immigration has no significant impact on property prices or the social housing
supply. These findings suggest that natives’ fear that immigration drives up property prices is
not supported by the data. The Austrian example mentioned earlier (Cavaille & Ferwerda
2016)—where native fear of competition with immigrants for a finite social housing stock
correlated with higher right-wing vote share—may have been without merit.
This is not to say that immigration in France is harmonious. The rise of the right-wing
National Front suggests that native French people are growing weary of sustained
immigration. Marine Le Pen, the National Front’s presidential candidate in 2017, won 33.9
percent of the popular vote in the run-off round. Though a minority, almost 11 million
French people sided with the notoriously anti-immigrant party. In 2015, the National Front
clarified its immigration policy goal—net legal migration of 10,000, significantly less than
2013’s 140,000 (AFP 2015). Further, there is evidence that ethnic minority immigrants face
significant discrimination. Bonnal, Boumahdi, and Favard (2012) find that non-European
foreigners on waiting lists for social housing experience much lengthier waits than others,
despite the legal obligation to base social housing allocations solely on welfare criteria.
Altogether, France mirrors the sample average findings regarding immigration’s
impact on the welfare state. In my (albeit limited) case study, I find no evidence of overtly
welfare chauvinistic public attitudes or policy changes in France. Immigration does not

3

The seeming discrepancy in magnitudes between Scanlon’s and d’Albis’ magnitudes is likely because they are
different measures—Scanlon estimated overall population proportions, whereas d’Albis’ figure is the proportion
of renters (as opposed to homeowners) who live in social housing.

21

appear to be a significant threat to welfare state solidarity, but it could be problematic
precisely because immigrants enjoy access. Immigrants’ disproportional use of certain
welfare programs, like unemployment insurance and social housing, might continue to add
pressure to France’s ability to finance these welfare programs.
VI. Conclusion
Mixed results surround my hypotheses of immigration’s effect on welfare spending.
Although several specifications do point to negative pressure on housing spending, the
findings’ sensitivity to model specification is a red flag that these results are not robust. The
other specifications that find no statistically significant relationship between immigration and
welfare spending are likely more accurate. The data most strongly support the null hypothesis
or H4: increased immigration does not significantly worsen natives’ beliefs about immigrants
or the welfare state, and even if it did, political opposition successfully blocks attempts to cut
spending. Another alternative explanation is that natives express anti-immigrant sentiment
not by depriving them of social assistance, but by attempting to limit future immigration
altogether. They might be sympathetic to the struggling immigrants who have already come
while supporting increasingly restrictive immigration policy.
This area of research is ripe for future study. Comprehensive data on social spending
in Europe is currently only available through 2015, the year in which massive spikes in
immigration (and specifically asylum seekers) skyrocketed. If there are eligibility and policy
lags, it may take several years to see the effects in social spending data. Further, more
reliable estimation techniques could shed light on the issue, like correctly identified
instrumental variables which mitigate endogeneity problems. The 2015 immigration surge
could be a suitable candidate for an event study. More country-specific case studies could
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examine the relationship between immigration and welfare support by harnessing regional
variation within a country. Further, investigating this relationship in Southern and Eastern
Europe would be instructive since these regions tend to adopt more restrictive immigration
policies. Finally, future work could explore alternative theoretical modeling if the true
relationship between immigration and social spending is non-linear.
Altogether, the practical implication of these findings is that there is no reliable
historical evidence to suggest that immigration is a menacing threat to Western Europe’s
social welfare systems. This holds true for both the sample average of 13 Western European
countries and the France-specific experience. On the contrary, immigration might be part of
the solution to Europe’s demographic pressures on the welfare state (although Murray [2018]
criticizes this idea as a Ponzi scheme). Europeans seem to have experienced a period of
increasing immigration without developing overtly welfare chauvinistic sentiments. At least
not yet. Recent surges in immigration and contemporary populist tendencies may eventually
expose social spending programs to more concrete threats of retrenchment. Until then, these
results provide a contrasting voice to the current literature that predicts Europe’s demise.
Like that of Mau, Steffen, and Burkhardt (2009), my analysis demonstrates that public
attitudes towards welfare are not just a simple reflex reaction to the degree of ethnic diversity
or the influx of immigrants into a country. They are mediated through institutional,
economic, and program-specific factors. Even though there might be significant challenges
for Europe’s welfare state, these findings suggest that immigration does not yet pose an
existential threat.
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Appendix
Sample of country-specific relationships between housing expenditure and foreign-born
inflow:
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